The Link Between Migration, Globalisation and Development Report Novib Expert Meeting Noordwijk a/d Zee, The Netherlands March 13-14, 2003 Content Novib Mission Statement Introduction   1. Presentation day (March 13, 2003) 2. Discussion day (March 14, 2003) 3. A preliminary agenda for action Annexes 1. Expert meeting working paper expert meeting (Novib) 2. Presentation paper D. Bagasao 3. Presentation paper H. Entzinger 4. Background paper P. Emmer 5. Presentation paper P. Stalker 6. List of participants Acknowledgement      Related Information

Annex 3. Presentation paper
Migration process as a natural phenomenon


Migration, Development and
the Ambiguous Role of the State

By Han Entzinger

1. Introduction
A
t the dawn of the 21st century many countries in the world are witnessing record levels of immigration. Between 1965 and 2000, the number of people who live outside the country where they were born has doubled from 75 to 150 million. More than half of these people live in developing countries and not in the industrialised countries. Contrary to popular belief, the rise in the number of immigrants has not been much higher than the increase in the world population as a whole in that period. However, the immigrant share in much of the Western world has practically doubled, from 3 to 6 per cent. Yet, at the turn of the millennium still not more than 2.5 per cent of the entire world population live outside their country of birth, and may therefore be defined as immigrants (Zlotnik 1998; Bertelsmann Foundation et al. 2000: 33).

Why then is it the case that migration has been rising so steeply on the international agenda lately, and why is it that the theme is likely to remain a ‘hot issue’ world-wide for the foreseeable future? Is it because people fear most of all the ‘dangers’ which they do not know? Is it globalisation and the idea that immeasurable reservoirs of immigrants may be opened up in developing countries? Is it the feeling that migration has become uncontrollable in an ever-smaller world? Is it a resurgence of xenophobia and nationalism, perhaps in response to growing internationalisation? So many factors may play a role in migration that it seems almost impossible to deconstruct and understand the phenomenon fully. In any case, this chapter has no ambition to provide a definitive answer to the questions just mentioned. It will argue that a major reason for the growing interest in migration is the fact that this is a field in which paradoxes, dilemmas and contradictions prevail.

In this chapter I will explore and analyse three major trends that affect current migration and which most probably will also affect future world migration. Each of these three covers an aspect of migration which is not only becoming more important on the political agenda, but which has also been receiving growing attention lately from social scientists, empiricists and theorists alike. Each of the three is characterised by a number of internal contradictions and therefore not easy to interpret, even upon closer analysis. This is what makes academics intrigued, politicians uncertain and the general public worried. The three trends are:

1. The growth of transnational networks, dating from earlier migration, and leading to a quasi-autonomous perpetuation of that process.
2. The persistent development gap in the world, which adds to existing migration pressures.

3. The ambiguity of state responses to migration and its effects.
These trends will be analysed primarily at a macro level, but they do have strong implications at intermediate and micro levels as well. Not only because the decision to migrate is nearly always an individual one, but also because a wide variety of institutional arrangements at intermediate levels are likely to affect that decision and its implementation.

2. Network migration and transnational communities

In his recent study on international migration Thomas Faist rightly asks the question: why do so many migrants come from so few places? (Faist 2000: 143) The answer is that once a migration flow has been set in motion, it is likely to become self-perpetuating. Migrant communities, once established in another country, tend to act as bridgeheads for more migrants with the same origins. This has not always been the case. Actually, the phenomenon of network migration has only fairly recently caught the attention of migration researchers. Monica Boyd was among the first to point out its relevance and to develop a theoretical approach (Boyd 1989). Prior to that, the most dominant migration theories, economically inspired as they were, did not really account for network migration. Migration was seen either as a decision by individuals weighing the pros and cons of going elsewhere to find a better future, or as a consequence of a structural imbalance in social and economic development between countries. The decisive role that the presence of relatives, friends or siblings in another country may play in the decision to migrate was long undervalued (Portes & Fernández Kelly 1989; Boyle et al. 1999).

It is obvious that network migration is greatly facilitated by today’s means of transport and communication (Stalker 2000: 117 ff). Many migrants can afford annual holidays in their country of origin, they watch television programmes and videos from home, phone calls have become very inexpensive and so have transportation fares. There is also the Internet, of course. It has become significantly easier to maintain close contacts with home, even during longer periods of absence. Contrary to common belief, members of a migration network do not always aspire to permanent settlement. Alejandro Portes and others have carried out extensive research into the role of migrant networks in the fulfilment of temporary labour needs (Portes 1995). Workers will come over for a particular job – even to destinations a few thousand kilometres away – and they leave when the job is finished. Back home their earnings will last much longer. Formal immigration rules do not always allow for such practices, but these can often be circumvented without too much difficulty. The migrant communities that are already present provide the required forms of security and protection. In her innovative studies on ‘global cities’ Saskia Sassen basically analysed the same phenomenon, which she linked up with industrial restructuring and de-industrialisation of the developed world (Sassen 1991). Since then many scholars have been following her work. Migrant communities, once they have settled in the new country - very often in the largest metropolitan areas, where contacts with others can be limited to a minimum – thus serve as catalysts for further migration. They may take over entire niches of the economy or create new ones.

Besides such economic effects, this new trend in migration also has important cultural and social consequences. The newly emerging transnational communities have developed into a rich field of study for sociologists and social anthropologists (Martiniello 1997; Portes et al. 1999; Faist 2000: 195 ff). Transnationalism is likely to limit the contacts of migrant communities with their immediate environment, since preference may be given to maintaining close ties with home. Why bother about your next-door neighbour if a phone call with your cousin back home costs almost nothing? The main question here is how this will affect the integration potential of immigrants. Will they indeed feel less inclined to seek contacts with the surrounding society and to participate in it? Or will the fact that migrant communities and migrant cultures are constantly prone to new impulses from the home country keep these alive, thus facilitating new forms of cultural pluralism, possibly less ritualised and more balanced than in the past? If that were to be the case, migrants might feel more self-confident, and less marginalised by their surroundings. This may then enhance their integration potential, rather than limit it. It remains to be seen, however, how a surrounding society will respond to such new trends, that clearly deviate from the path towards assimilation as it has traditionally been perceived.

Network migration and transnationalism clearly provide new impulses to the old debate between pluralists and assimilationists (Gans 1997). Since the 1970s, there has been a tendency towards migration and integration research to reject assimilationist ideas as old fashioned and as no longer corresponding to reality. Multiculturalism was on the rise on the academic as well as on the political agenda, to the extent that Nathan Glazer – not really reputed for his unequivocal support for pluralist views - exclaimed: We are all multiculturalists now! (Glazer 1997). As western societies have seen themselves become culturally more diverse as a result of immigration, much of today’s public debate is about the limits of such diversity. The wearing of headscarves and genital mutilation practices – both of these habits among certain immigrant communities - appear to have become the epitomes of this debate, at least in Europe (Carens 2000: 140 ff). In major immigration countries outside Europe (the US, Canada, Australia) the use of language, especially the public role of languages other than English, serves as a comparable rallying point (Zolberg & Woon 1999). The often-ambiguous public response to such issues will be dealt with later.

Continuing immigration clearly leads to a lot of unease and uncertainty on every side. Many believe that a powerful world religion like Islam seeks to expand its sphere of influence, using immigration as a vehicle. Others, especially those more familiar with the role of ethnicity, consider this affirmation of identities as an expression of the immigrants’ desire to strengthen their position in their new environment. It should not necessarily be seen as a rejection of that new environment. Indeed, affirming one’s group affiliation may create forms of togetherness that, in the perception of a particular group and its members, can open up certain opportunities, and thus improve their situation in the new society (Bauböck 1996: 226). From social anthropology we know that a common way of reaffirming feelings of belonging and of togetherness is to mark group boundaries (Barth 1969; Vermeulen & Govers 1994). This can be achieved by selecting or even inventing symbols of ethnicity (Anderson 1983; Roosens 1989; Gans 1999: 167-201). This leads to the seeming paradox that an affirmation of group identity and group membership can be interpreted as a phase in the integration process in the new society, and not just as an expression of a continuing identification with the country of origin.

By definition, the processes just discussed take place at a group level. Many researchers have observed that at the individual level integration advances ,simultaneously and steadily, though at times quite slowly. The integration of immigrants - understood as their increasing participation in a society’s core institutions, such as the school system or the labour market - progresses in nearly all situations, despite legal obstacles or discrimination (Alba & Nee 1997). Favourable economic conditions may speed up the process, whereas the integration ‘model’ favoured by the public authorities in a country does not appear to be very relevant (Taïeb 1998; Entzinger 2000). Meanwhile, acculturation also continues to develop. People with an immigrant background, in particular those who belong to the second and subsequent generations nearly always identify increasingly with values and behavioural norms of the dominant society, however diverse these may be. A rise in the number of inter-ethnic friendships and in intermarriage – the traditional indicator for assimilation – also appears to be the rule rather than the exception (Gordon 1964; Alba 1990; Phalet et al. 2000).

However, integration and acculturation, the two major elements of the process of immigrant incorporation, do not always advance simultaneously and at the same pace. Patterns vary from one immigrant community to another, from one domain of society to another, and even from one individual to another (Sowell 1981; Engbersen & Gabriëls 1995; Zhou 1977). It has been found that family values as well as norms and behaviour immediately linked to religious practices and beliefs tend to be preserved for relatively long periods of time. This can be functional, since it provides migrants with a sense of continuity and security required for a successful integration (Gans 1997). It may also be dysfunctional, particularly when it leads to intergenerational tensions and clashes within families, to problems over educational issues and at times also to delinquent behaviour.

In recent research we have found that in a liberal western society, migrants as well as members of the original population acknowledge an important difference between the private and the public domains. For most people, immigrants and non-immigrants alike, a much wider variation in values and behaviour appears to be acceptable in the former rather than in the latter (Phalet et al. 2000: 77-82). Disputes, of course, are likely to occur not only when the demarcation between the two domains is at stake – as, for example, in educational matters (Rex 1985) - but even more so in cases where values and expected behaviour in the two sectors clearly clash. Wherever this is the case, it will first of all be the migrants themselves who are confronted with the ensuing dilemmas. The majority population of the surrounding society will primarily be in a spectator’s role. Nevertheless, when a case comes up that does confront society with the effects of immigration and multiculturalism, particularly in the public domain, the clash can be ferocious. The case of the affaire du foulard in France, the Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom or the debate on article 187 in California are illustrative of this.

The seemingly contradictory trends in ethnic affirmation at group level on the one hand and individual integration on the other lead us to draw two preliminary conclusions. One is that disputes and tensions about the degree of adaptation to dominant norms and integration into mainstream society and its institutions are more likely to occur within immigrant communities than between these communities and the dominant society. The second generation is in a pivotal position here. Only if their participation in the surrounding society is sufficiently ensured will the incorporation process advance (Gans 1999: 203-223). This conclusion is not so different from what has already long been known. The growing relevance of transnationalism is not very likely to change this.

A second conclusion seems equally important, but perhaps more innovative. Network migration tends to stretch out the immigration process over very long periods. Moreover, the need for individual migrants to make a choice between temporary or permanent settlement is by no means as pressing any more as in the past. As a consequence, it has become much more difficult to consider immigrant communities as relatively closed groups whose members pass through the ‘assimilation machine’ in more or less the same sequence and at roughly the same speed. Today’s immigrant communities may simultaneously consist of third generation migrants and migrants who arrived just yesterday, of permanent settlers and of transients. We do not yet know very much about how this phenomenon will affect the potential for incorporation either of individual migrants or of entire migrant communities. Will processes of integration and acculturation be speeded up or be slowed down, or will they be indifferent to this new development? Will it be easier for migrants to develop and to preserve multiple identities? Or will the established migrants turn away from the newcomers, not wishing to assume a role as intermediaries or ‘cultural brokers’ and thus possibly disrupt the emergence of strong migrant communities? There are sound arguments in favour of any of these options. That alone is a sufficient reason for putting transnationalism, network migration and their effects high on the research agenda during the years to come.

3. The persistent development gap

Even if employment opportunities were evenly spread over the world, and even if prospects for individual development were roughly similar in all places, people would still be tempted to migrate. To some the grass may look greener elsewhere, others may simply be driven by curiosity and there will always continue to be family reasons or better job or schooling conditions that may incite people to leave their homes, whether temporarily or for good. In reality, however, opportunities are not evenly spread over the world and development prospects differ widely. Moreover, as long as there is political repression there will also be political refugees.

These are potentially powerful arguments to expect more migration. But will it actually happen? It had been assumed for some time that the need for unskilled workers in the richest countries of the world would decrease, not only as a result of automation, but also because of production transfers to low wage countries. Both trends, very dominantly present in the 1980s, did indeed lead to a remarkable change in the labour market structures in much of the western world. The need for unskilled ‘temporary’ migrant workers virtually disappeared, except in a few sectors of the economy where relatively limited numbers of migrants were used as a buffer force, sometimes illegally (Sassen 1991). Many expected this to be the end of migration (Hollifield 1992). As we have seen, migration has not stopped, and not only because of the establishment of networks. The development gap has not narrowed either, although certain countries have changed camps (Bradshaw & Wallace 1996). Between 1960 and 1990 the ratio of the income of the richest countries in comparison to the poorest ones rose by 45 per cent (Stalker 2000: 17). There have also been major political changes in the world, often concurrently with economic transformations. Consequently, new migration patterns have emerged, for example between Eastern and Western Europe, between South West Asia and Europe, between South East Asia and North America, within South East Asia, and in Africa (Castles & Miller 1998; Massey et al. 1998; SOPEMI 1999: 17-64).

Today’s migration patterns are unbelievably more complex than those of a generation ago (Zlotnik 1998). Migration occurs spontaneously much more frequently than in the past. The role of recruitment officials and of bilateral agreements between states is no longer very relevant. To a certain extent this role has been taken over by multinational companies, commercial brokers and to some extent also by traffickers, eager to exploit potential migrants (Stalker 2000: 122-126). Many states have become receivers as well as senders of migrants. Many countries, for example in Central Europe, also accommodate substantial numbers of transients, temporary migrants waiting for an opportunity to move on to another place, usually one that is higher on the list of preferred destinations (Okóloski 1999).
Migration now takes place at virtually all skill levels, although there is a tendency for it to dichotomise. There is a disproportionately high representation of the highest and lowest skill levels, but the conditions applicable to these two vary immensely. Highly skilled migrants usually comply with all the regulations and hold a work permit; their numbers have been rising lately (Koser & Salt 1997; SOPEMI 1999: 24). Migrants at low skill levels are often undocumented. Therefore much less is known about their numbers and whereabouts (Burgers & Engbersen 1999). Given this highly diffuse pattern, it is not so easy to assess what is likely to happen during the coming years. Economic as well as demographic developments will be of interest here, as well as political developments. In oppressive states with a poor human rights record, economic prospects are usually not very bright. Many people will want to leave such countries in one way or another, rather than invest in their economic development. Differential birth rates are another major reason why the development gap persists. In situations, however, where developing countries have successfully reduced the number of births, their per capita income goes up much more quickly. This is an important condition for further economic growth, but it is certainly not the only one.

Another pressing question, to which we only know the beginning of an answer, is whether economic development, once it has been gaining momentum, will lead to more or to less emigration (Stalker 2000: 22). There is empirical evidence for both views, so more research will be required to specify the conditions. The same holds for the possible effects of a freer trade between developing and developed countries (Chesnais 1998: 261). The argument for a decrease in emigration is that, if the prospects for further economic growth are good, there is no need to leave the country any longer. This is, for example, how the relatively limited size of - non-ethnic and non-refugee - migration from Central to Western Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall is commonly explained (Layard et al. 1994). The argument for more emigration is that economic development often goes hand in hand with the emergence of a middle class, whose members are better educated and have higher earnings. This actually enables them to implement the desire to widen their horizons by trying to seize opportunities elsewhere. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the educational level of those who migrate from developing countries is well above the local average. Schooling systems in many of these countries educate far more people than their labour markets can accommodate at the corresponding level (Stalker 2000: 107-115). Under these conditions, emigration of a relatively well educated surplus can be a desirable short term alternative for school leavers and for public authorities alike. After all, remittances of about 80 billion euro annually are a major source of foreign currency world wide, from Algeria to Yugoslavia. Others, however, consider this ‘surplus drain’ to be a form of ‘brain drain’, which in the long term slows down the bridging of development gap or even makes it wider (Bertelsmann Foundation 2000: 26, 36).

The volume and direction of immigration are not just determined by the supply side, which we have discussed so far, but even more so by the demand for immigrants. Here some potentially dramatic developments can be expected during the years to come. The combination of continuing economic growth and ageing populations will most likely push up the demand for manpower in much of the developed world, but particularly in Europe, where the ageing problem will be sharpest (United Nations 2000; The Economist 2000; Bartram 2000). This demand will be particularly acute in those sectors of the economy that cannot be relocated to countries with a labour surplus, such as health care, personal services, construction and catering. In much of the Western world, the younger age cohorts are too small to fulfil the demand for labour. The long-term unemployed cannot always be redirected to the labour market, particularly in the European welfare states. The new demand for labour will be most acute at the two ends of the skills spectrum, the highly skilled to do the work for which not enough people can be educated, and the low skilled to do the dirty, unattractive and temporary work. For both types of activities manpower abounds in much of the developing world and both sides are well aware of this. However, this does not automatically imply that major new migration flows will shortly spring up all over the world. Even though migration pressure will increase, much will depend on the arrangements to be made for its regulation. This is largely, but not exclusively, in the hands of the receiving states who have been joining forces for this purpose by defining common immigration policies (Wihtol de Wenden 1999a: 27-87). In this field, important dilemmas are emerging that require a much better understanding of what is actually taking place.

It is a well-known fact that in the past two decades, all the potential countries of destination have gradually tightened their immigration policies (Brochmann & Hammar 1999). This has happened partly in response to a growing migration pressure, and partly as a consequence of increased numbers of immigrants and hostile public reactions to them. For the prospective migrant who originates in a developing country and who has no direct family members in the country of destination, this leaves only a very limited number of options open. If the migrant has high skills that happen to be in demand elsewhere, he or she may try to enter as a labour migrant, but opportunities for doing so are extremely limited. One alternative is to try and enter illegally and work in the informal sector, in the hope of not being caught upon entering, or at a later date (Gosh 1998). The other alternative is to claim political asylum in anticipation of being allowed to start the procedure which may then last up to several years.

Numerous attempts by European states to make the claiming of political asylum less attractive have not led to a lasting decrease in numbers, but only to more insecurity and to fewer opportunities for all migrants, whether refugees or not. Apparently, even an insecure position in a developed country can be more attractive to some than life in a developing country without any prospects at all and with no political freedom. As a consequence, current policy practices in this domain tend to generate a quasi-tolerated category of migrants in the developed countries with many characteristics of an underclass. By allowing this to happen, these countries are once again challenging their own principles of equality and humanitarianism which, paradoxically, they claim to safeguard through their adherence to the refugee conventions. Another basic problem is that in their admissions policies many Western states persevere in making a fundamental distinction between economic and political motives for migration, whereas in reality that distinction is not always so clear cut (Enzensberger 1994: 46). Prospective migrants, understandably, make strategic choices and opt for the entrance gate that offers the best perspectives.

All this does not encourage a broad public comprehension for the phenomenon of immigration. The search for ways to reconcile the requirements of markets on the one hand and the reluctance of states on the other will have to be intensified. It seems almost certain that whatever solution is found, it will be possible to develop and implement it only through close co-operation between all the countries involved: receiving, sending and transit countries. The latter two types of countries must be partners in such arrangements if lasting opportunities for a more balanced development are to be created (Falchi 1995; Bertelsmann Foundation 2000). Whatever the outcome of the interplay of economic, social and geo-political arguments may be, a more profound understanding of what is actually taking place and what is likely to happen in the near future seems imperative.

4. The ambiguous role of the state

As we have just seen, immigration presents the state with a number of dilemmas that are not likely to be solved in the foreseeable future. Many of these are related to questions of access, inclusion and membership. International migration challenges the traditional concept of the state in a variety of manners. An awareness of this is only beginning to develop (Joppke 1998; Wihtol de Wenden 1999b; Hollifield 2000). How do governments cope with such challenges? The most straightforward answer seems to be by muddling through or, in more civilised terms, by being ‘realistic’ (Sciortino 2000). Given today’s dense international traffic of people, it is no longer realistic to assume that a country’s borders can be guarded effectively, even though traditionally the right to do so is the almost supreme expression of a state’s sovereignty (Freeman 1998). Border controls, particularly in heavily travelled areas are usually haphazard. Long coastlines cannot be guarded effectively at all, as Italy and Spain have been experiencing. In much of the European Union, internal border controls have been removed completely and replaced by stricter controls at external borders. In places where two countries of vastly different development levels share a common border (e.g. along the Rio Grande or in certain places in Central Europe) the monitoring is more intense, but there too it is never completely effective (Wihtol de Wenden 1999a: 19-26).

In the knowledge that such mechanisms of external control have been losing their effectiveness, states increasingly revert to internal controls (Brochmann 1999: 12ff). These may take the form of police spot-checks in places where large numbers of irregular immigrants can be expected, but they can also be more sophisticated. Since the large-scale introduction of computerised administration systems, it has become almost impossible to live in a country without being registered in numerous places. Those who are not registered do not qualify for certain entitlements and benefits. It is hard to remain unnoticed in an environment where every tenant, schoolchild, car driver, taxpayer, telephone subscriber or sick person has to be registered (Engbersen et al. 1999). Modern technology makes it easy to link up computerised administrations with one another and also with the aliens’ administration. After initial hesitations this has now become common practice, legally endorsed, in many countries. I referred above to this phenomenon as the ‘dual border of the welfare state’. As the first, the geographical border has become more obsolete, being superseded by the second border, the virtual one that provides access to the provisions of the welfare state. (Entzinger 1994).

As a consequence of such practices, most liberal democratic states are now faced with people living in their territories who are in dissimilar legal situations and who have differential rights and entitlements to certain benefits. This is not perceived as a problem in traditional states with authoritarian regimes as, for example, in certain countries of the Middle East that host large numbers of temporary migrant workers. It is a problem, however, for the liberal democratic state, which cherishes its principles of equal treatment and equal opportunity (Bommes 1999). Differential treatment may be acceptable for migrants with only a brief residence record, when the perspective of a full incorporation is looming. Not all, however, who live in these states can be classified as ‘citizens-on-the-probe’.

Large-scale immigration and the liberal and democratic welfare state appear to be strange bedfellows. Grete Brochmann calls this the immigration/welfare paradox (Brochmann 1999: 15). Neither the early thinkers on the welfare state, nor its founders have paid any attention to a possible impact of immigration on its functioning.


The welfare state was perceived as a closed system. Even a great philosopher like John Rawls only became aware of this in his more recent work (Carens 1995). Some argue that a growing awareness that maintaining the welfare state is a costly affair seems to transform it from a mechanism of institutionalised equality into one of institutionalised inequality (Bommes 1999: 219).

It is highly questionable whether the higher entrance barriers to the welfare state will really make potential migrants decide to refrain from coming. Although research into migration motives is always a delicate affair, there is ample evidence that opportunities for employment and education are by far the most favourite reasons why a person decides to migrate, not welfare benefits (Schoorl et. al. 2000). People tend to opt for a country where the likelihood is highest that they can stay on and find a job. Quite often this happens to be a country where they already have relatives or friends, as we have seen in the discussion of network migration. The advantages to be gained from migration are so strong that most potential migrants will not shy away as a result of stricter immigration rules, reduced welfare benefits or an illegal status. They seem to argue that, notwithstanding such obstacles, conditions are still better than at home. However, the stricter the entry rules, the less likely it becomes that the migrant will ever leave the country voluntarily, even if living there turns into a disappointment.

The developments described here explain why a renewed interest for issues of membership and a sense of belonging has emerged in the social sciences. In sociology this interest focuses on mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, particularly in major areas of society such as the labour market, education, housing and the social services. More recently, a new dimension has been given to this debate as a result of the growing interest of political scientists and political philosophers in matters of immigration and integration. Their focus is on rights, citizenship and culture, rather than on inclusion and exclusion, but the mechanisms studied are basically the same, despite differences in theoretical foundations (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Bauböck 1994; Gutmann, Ed. 1994; Soysal 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Hollifield 1997; Favell 1998; Joppke 1999).

International migration can be seen as a challenge to the traditional notion of the nation-state. This concept has developed over the past two centuries, predominantly in the western world. It reflects a relatively closed legal and political system (the state) whose members – or citizens - share a sense of togetherness that is rooted in a common culture and history and often a common language as well (the nation). During the gradual process of nation-state formation the two concepts have become increasingly intertwined (Smith 1995; Pierson 1996). The laws and institutions of the nation-state are based on the values shared by its members, the citizens. Immigration brings in people and groups that may not or not fully share these values and that may claim the right to be treated differently (Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 1-41). The honouring of such claims will often require the creation of special provisions for specific groups, and it will therefore lead to a certain degree of institutionalised multiculturalism (Bauböck 1996). Some consider the recognition of particularism and difference a basic trait of liberal democracies, rather than universality and equality (Young 1990). Many others recognise that a certain tension between pluralism and equality is always present (Carens 2000). Some argue, perhaps more pragmatically, that recognising the relevance of ethnic and cultural difference in an immigration country is wiser than neglecting it. Eventually this may prove to be the better way to keep society together (Leggewie 1997: 252). However, the principles of toleration cannot be laid down in advance, and they will have to be discussed constantly (Parekh 1996). There is also the more practical argument that recognising cultural difference requires a codification of minority cultures by the state.
This is difficult to achieve, particularly in the case of highly dynamic immigrant cultures. For example: should mother tongue teaching in public schools reflect the values of the country of origin, even if that country is clearly not a liberal democracy (Entzinger 1999)?

In practice, nearly every western immigration country has now allowed certain forms of institutionalised multiculturalism supported by the state, especially at the local level (Modood & Werbner 1997). However, states differ substantially in their degree of acceptance and support. Acknowledging differences in religion is usually not a problem, including the recognition of certain practices based in traditionally non-western religions (Parekh 1996). This does not mean, however, that the overall acceptance by the general public of, for example, Islam in the western world is high. The response to claims for the recognition of institutionalised forms of ethnicity, as for example in ethnic associations, is more problematic, at least in certain countries. Ethnic differences are often seen as a greater potential threat to the unity of the nation-state than religious differences, which most liberal states have learned to accommodate. Language is an even more problematic issue, especially when its use in public life and in schools is at stake. In recent years, several countries reputed for their pluralistic approach in these matters (e.g. Canada, Australia, Sweden and the Netherlands) have reversed their policies. They have reduced or even abandoned some of their specific ‘multicultural’ facilities, like those for mother tongue teaching, and are now stressing the need for a better knowledge of the dominant language and for more national unity. The strongest agreement exists on the need for all those resident in a country to respect the country’s Constitution and its laws, even though these may be adapted to new circumstances. Legal pluriformity, which means granting differential rights to different communities, and which exists in various non-western states, is not an option in the liberal democratic nation-state.

We may conclude that there is a genuine concern among some that immigration constitutes a serious challenge to the concept of national sovereignty and the role of the state. In the light of these trends it will not be difficult to predict that the study of social integration, social cohesion and related concepts will rise further on the research agenda of the social sciences in the near future. As immigration goes on, issues of unity and diversity will increasingly intrigue people. The same holds for the question of how these two will continue to interact with one another within the context of the nation-state which, for many other reasons as well, is undergoing profound transformations.

5. Conclusion

Our analysis of three major trends that affect current and future migration does not point in any one clear direction. This is not surprising, since the field is full of paradoxes, dilemmas and contradictions. Under such circumstances the task of the social scientist is to generate knowledge that can contribute to a better understanding of seemingly contradicting phenomena and that may provide answers to unsolved issues. Academics and practitioners alike need to have a better understanding of how migration works, of the factors that affect it, and of how it is likely to develop. Of course, theorising may be helpful here, but it also has its limits. As Alejandro Portes argues, there is no overall encompassing theory of immigration. The reason, he writes, is that the different areas that make up this field are so disparate that they can only be unified at a highly abstract and probably vacuous level (Portes 1997: 810).

Thus, the complexity of the theme requires some modesty. Theorising in migration matters can only be partial and it seems to be most promising in those situations in which migration is linked with other developments. Therefore, we will have to look at the wider context, at its causes and its effects. What has made migration rise so steeply on the international political agenda is precisely the feeling that its causes are potentially uncontrollable by those who are faced with its consequences. Many migration experts have argued that immigration control mechanisms in reality are much more effective than is commonly believed, that most migration that does take place is perfectly legitimate and, therefore, that most flows are well under control (Zolberg 1999). It is true, however, that it remains hard to understand why seemingly similar conditions sometimes do lead to international migration and sometimes do not. It remains equally difficult to understand why the course of incorporation processes of newly arriving immigrants varies so widely, even when conditions may look similar. Finally, we are still very much puzzled by certain aspects of the way in which individual migrants cope with their situation, more particularly by the possible effects of an increasing globalisation on their orientations and identifications. In each of these three fields, major transformations are taking place or can be expected shortly and we do not seem to be fully able to understand them. In each of these three, therefore, we need to have a better insight into determinant factors and in causal relationships. We may then discover regularities hitherto unknown and possibly predict reliable future developments as well.

The first field in which more theorising should be encouraged lies at the interface of migration and development studies. As we have seen in this chapter, the classical question of whether development encourages migration or reduces it has never been answered in a satisfactory manner. We do not know very much about the conditions that determine which of the two is the dependent variable and which is the independent one. There are also practical reasons why some urgency should be given to theorising in this area. The need for a better understanding of the links between migration and development will become more pressing not only because of advancing globalisation, but also since the demand for migrant labour in the richer parts of the world is likely to increase. Moreover, as the awareness is growing that migration for economic reasons and for political reasons share some of their causes, the current highly differential responses to these two may lead to unmanageable problems. A better understanding of similarities and differences in their determinants and effects is therefore required. Theorising in this field should not be limited to a macro level of states and national economies, but should aim equally at providing better insights into individual decision making by potential migrants.

The second field is situated at the interface of migration and integration. As such, this is a classical field of research in which an impressive amount of theorising has been achieved. Traditionally, most of this work focused on the role of the market and on acculturation processes. Until a decade ago the ‘is it race or is it class?’ debate dominated this field. Since then, more interest has shifted to the role of the state, almost to the extent that ‘it is citizenship’ seems to have been proclaimed as the answer to the ‘race or class?’ question. One reason for this may be that European political scientists and American Europeanists have started to play a more dominant role in migration studies. In the United States, the market has always been the primary institution for incorporating immigrants. The state is relatively weak, but there is a long-standing pro-immigration ideology. The challenge to theorising is that all this is very different in Europe. There, the role of the state is much stronger, notwithstanding recent changes. Growing numbers of immigrants actually confront the state and its welfare arrangements with demands that are hard to reconcile, such as equal treatment, respect for diversity, a strive for unity, and the perceived need to keep numbers under control as a basic condition to fulfil the other demands. The state is indeed very important in both immigration and integration, and its role must be further explored. However, these explorations must not be limited to political aspects alone. In order to achieve a more balanced theory, social, economic and cultural aspects should be taken into account as well.


Finally, much more theorising needs to be done on the impact of new developments in migration on migrants’ attitudes and orientations. One may doubt if traditional distinctions such as assimilation versus cultural retention still have a sufficient explanatory power in an era of globalisation, transnationalism and satellite dishes. There is a growing evidence from research that many of today’s migrants are successful in simultaneously coping with the demands of two or more different cultural environments. The development of transnational communities may enable them to commute not only geographically, but also culturally. Is this what is actually happening? If so, what is the impact of such processes on the loyalties of individuals and on their identification with institutions, including the nation-state? Many of these are sceptical about dual membership. Will future responses of receiving societies be as understanding as that of most of academia, or will there be stronger anti-immigrant feelings and a growing scepticism about dual membership? Possibly in an effort to prevent this from happening, certain immigration countries are committing migrants to stepping up their integration efforts. How can the apparently contradictory trends of transnationalism and the need to promote integration be reconciled? At present we simply do not have enough knowledge to answer these questions. Globalisation has dramatically changed the face of international migration. We are only beginning to understand its effects on the functioning of individuals, communities, institutions and entire societies.


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Summary

Prof. Han Entzinger, Professor of Migration and Integration Studies at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, analysed the phenomenon of migration, its history, the pressures, economic and political developments that have global and regional implications, trends and sociological factors that will continue to affect migration in the future. Entzinger said that “the character of migration has changed to include more people who have fled their countries due to wars and repression and are knocking on the door of Western Europe.” Migration has also become so complex in its motives and in its effect on the countries of destination, which perceive migrants, coming in for whatever reason, as threats to public order and local employment and act accordingly on the basis of that perception. “We have to emphasise the importance of understanding the phenomenon of migration and the potential influence, whether positive or not, for the socio-cultural, political and economic conditions of Europe,” Entzinger concluded.

Some issues emerging from the discussion

• Should we add the safety discussion to the 4 trends (i.e., continuation, proliferation, diversification, and trans-nationalism) mentioned?
• Migration gets freer, but it is not possible to predict whether it diminishes inequality.
• People migrate when their lives are likely to improve in the new country (and sometimes they are just curious).
• These days, in many cases, migration is not a necessity anymore. People migrate out of their own will.
• Do we need to regulate migration? Arrangements are more viable when they contain rules on investments, remittances, security, human rights, etc. There is a potential for this kind of agreements, either from the side of migration or from the side of development. But it is an illusion to think that migration can be regulated completely.
• How do we deal with the decline in safety due to migration? This is a difficult issue. Freedom of travel attracts crime (unwanted trade). In some cases, crime causes migration (networks). In other cases, marginalised migrants, for instance, use crime to survive. It should however be clear that this is only part of the story. As far as public opinion is concerned, crime and migration often go hand in hand.